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INTRODUCTION
In September 2020, Tom was arrested for, and subsequently charged
with, possession of half an ounce of marijuana with intent to distribute in
a Louisiana state court, his first criminal drug adjudication. 1 Under
Louisiana’s existing laws regulating the penalties for possession with
intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic, 2 Tom was subject to
imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for no less than one year and no
more than ten years. 3 Because this was Tom’s first drug offense, and
because he was in possession of less than an ounce of marijuana, he was
sentenced to no more than the one-year minimum prescribed in Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 40:966(B)(1)(A), Louisiana’s relevant drug-penalty
law. 4 After Tom’s prison term ended, he completed his probationary
period to the sentencing court’s satisfaction, thereby allowing the court to
set aside and dismiss his felony conviction pursuant to Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 893(E)(2), (3), or (4). 5
Unfortunately, times were hard for Tom in the years following his
release from state supervision, as it is difficult for an individual with a
prior felony to attain meaningful employment even if the formal

Copyright 2022, by HARPER G. STREET.
∗ J.D./D.C.L. candidate, 2022 Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. Special thanks to my Executive Senior Editor, Brittany Williams Flanders;
my Senior Editor, Zach Lester; and my faculty advisor, Robert Lancaster. This
Comment would not be what it is today without your guidance and support.
1. The facts in this hypothetical are very loosely based on the facts in State
v. Noble, 133 So. 3d 703 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014).
2. For more information on federal drug scheduling, see Drug Scheduling:
Drug Schedules, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drugscheduling [https://perma.cc/J92B-GC93] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020) (designating
marijuana as a Schedule 1 narcotic by the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration).
3. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:966(B)(1)(a) (2021).
4. Id.
5. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893(E)(2)–(4) (2021).
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prosecution has been set aside. 6 As a result, Tom once again looked to
drug dealing as a means of economically sustaining himself. In 2024, Tom
was charged with possession with the intent to distribute half an ounce of
marijuana for the second time. Fortunately for Tom, the Louisiana
Legislature passed House Bill 518 in 2019, amending Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 15:529.1—or the habitual-offender statute, as it is colloquially
known—so that it now bars prosecutors from using prior nonviolent felony
convictions to enhance the sentences of defendants convicted of
subsequent nonviolent felonies. 7 Thus, Tom will only be subjected to the
penalties prescribed specifically for the charge he received, which would
likely be around one to five years based on the relatively small amount of
narcotics he was caught with, setting his prospective release date at around
2029. 8 In all, it is likely that Tom will only serve around six to seven years
total for both of his convictions. On the one hand, with a growing number
of states legalizing the recreational use of marijuana, 9 Tom’s sentence still
appears to be rather harsh. On the other hand, it is a much smaller and
more justified penalty than the one that he may have received just a few
years earlier. 10
Consider a similar circumstance taking place in 2015, just five years
before Tom’s first felony conviction in 2020. Like Tom and countless
other Louisianians, Mark struggles to get by in an economy that does not
make itself readily accessible to individuals with criminal records.
Because Mark’s criminal record serves as a barrier to obtaining
meaningful employment and supporting himself financially, he has
frequently turned to selling marijuana to earn a livable wage. In June 2015,
Mark was arrested and subsequently convicted of possession with intent
to distribute half an ounce of marijuana, the same offense as the one Tom
would be charged with five years later. Mark had previously been
convicted of the same crime in a Louisiana state court in 2012. Like Tom,
he had satisfied his probationary period following his release from custody
to the court’s satisfaction, allowing for the conviction to be set aside and
6. See Richard A. Webster, Louisiana’s Felons Face the Most Employment
Obstacles in U.S., TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 19, 2019), https://www.nola.com/
news/politics/article_31d759ec-8fa9-5e11-afb0-27e8f4c7c60a.html [https://perm
a.cc/TQ72-P4L2].
7. Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 15:529.1(C)(3) (2021).
8. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:966(B)(1)(a)(2021).
9. Alicia Wallace, These States Are Voting on Cannabis Legalization This
November, CNN BUS. (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/12/bus
iness/cannabis-ballot-2020-election/index.html [https://perma.cc/2NHR-KDFC].
10. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:966(B)(3) (2016).
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the prosecution dismissed. 11 Unfortunately for Mark, however, the version
of Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute in effect at the time of his 2015
marijuana conviction allowed prosecutors to consider the conviction as a
prior felony offense—even though it had been set aside and dismissed
pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure—thereby providing
the basis for prosecuting Mark for the 2015 arrest as a habitual offender. 12
The version of the habitual-offender statute in effect from August 15,
2010, to October 31, 2017, provided, in pertinent part:
[I]f the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less
than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be
for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and
not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first
conviction. 13
Pursuant to the version of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:966 in effect
from June 29, 2015, to July 31, 2016, a person convicted for possession
with intent to distribute a “substance classified in Schedule 1 [such as]
marijuana . . . shall upon conviction be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than thirty
years.” 14 Because Mark was tried in his 2015 conviction as a secondfelony habitual offender, the law required that he serve a minimum of 15
years in prison, with a potential maximum sentence of 60 years.
Subsection K of the current habitual-offender statute provides that a
defendant’s case must be adjudicated in accordance with the version of the
statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. 15 As a result,
Mark cannot seek to lower his sentence to be consistent with the current
provisions of the statute barring the use of prior nonviolent felony offenses
for sentence enhancement purposes. 16 Thus, even if Mark only serves the
minimum statutorily prescribed sentence of 15 years, he would not be
released until at least a year after Tom, even though Tom was not
sentenced until five years after Mark. 17 In all, Mark would serve at least
seven to eight more years than Tom despite the fact they committed the
exact same offenses just five years apart from each other. This
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893(E)(2)–(4) (2021).
Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (2019).
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(A)(1) (2017).
Id. § 40:966(B)(3) (2016).
Id. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
Id.
Id.; id. § 40:966(B)(3) (2016); id. § 15:529.1(A)(1) (2017).
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hypothetical situation is a relatively minor example of the injustices that
have occurred and will continue to occur under the current language of the
habitual-offender statute. Thus, the legislature must amend the statute
further, beyond the changes enacted in House Bill 518. This will ensure
that people like Mark will no longer be subject to unduly harsh prison
sentences that are not congruent with the statute’s current sentencing
scheme or the public’s shifting attitude toward the appropriate
punishments for nonviolent offenders. 18
The current version of Louisiana’s habitual-offender law is located in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:529.1. 19 Prior to 2019, the statute
imposed enhanced sentences on defendants convicted of subsequent
violent felonies as well as subsequent nonviolent felonies. 20 Under the
authority of the pre-2019 version of Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute,
courts most commonly enhanced the prison terms of defendants convicted
of possession of a Schedule II narcotic, a nonviolent offense. 21 In fact,
nearly 64% of inmates serving enhanced sentences in Louisiana prisons
under the state’s habitual-offender law are imprisoned for nonviolent
offenses. 22 Furthermore, under the strict sentencing guidelines of
Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute, the Louisiana prison population
reached 40,000 incarcerated citizens in 2012. 23
18. Cf. Hayley H. Fritchie, State v. Noble: Mandatory Minimum Madness in
Louisiana, 89 TUL. L. REV. 933, 938 (2015) (“Louisiana’s resistance to reform
comes at a time when public opinion conflicts with the length of the state’s
mandatory sentences, as demonstrated by a 2014 state poll that revealed that 78%
of those surveyed opposed prison terms longer than six months for persons with
multiple convictions of simple marijuana possession.”).
19. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1 (2021).
20. Id.
21. LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS., REMOVE NONVIOLENT OFFENSES FROM
HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE (2019), https://assets.website-files.com/5a946
2f6b010650001b8d7bd/5ca38fafaf774a08c82a1905_CJR_LPA%20Habitual%2
0Offenders%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DJ7-DVZM]
(citing
PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., LOUISIANA DATA ANALYSIS PART II: PRISON TRENDS
CONTINUED (2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/la_drivers_ii_
presentation_9-23-16_final.pdf#page=15&zoom=auto,-64,717 [https://perma.cc
/Z5DX-5HVC] [hereinafter PEW, LOUISIANA DATA ANALYSIS PART II]).
22. Id.
23. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS
3 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/03/pspp_louisianas_20
17_criminal_justice_reforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z3K-NGXR] (citing data
collected from the Louisiana Department of Corrections and the U.S. Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics) [hereinafter PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS].
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Recently, though, the governor and the Louisiana Legislature have
taken a number of measures to combat this issue.24 Governor John Bel
Edwards signed into law the 2017 Louisiana Criminal Justice Reform Act
in an effort to reduce the state’s total prison population and the ensuing
burden on taxpayers. 25 The Louisiana Legislature went a step further in
2019 by enacting House Bill 518, which removed certain nonviolent
felony offenses from sentence enhancement considerations under
§ 15:529.1. 26
Though the Louisiana Legislature and Governor John Bel Edwards
have taken meaningful steps to rectify many of the problems that the
state’s habitual-offender statute created, one lingering problem remains.
Pursuant to § 15:529.1(K), “[N]otwithstanding any provision of the law to
the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were
in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was committed.”27
Thus, the provisions of the habitual-offender statute amended by House
Bill 518, which removed nonviolent offenses from sentencing
enhancement considerations, only operate prospectively. 28 While these
amendments will hypothetically decrease the prison population over time
by preventing the sentence enhancement of Louisiana citizens convicted
of their second nonviolent felony offense after their enactment, the
amendments fail to reduce the substantial number of nonviolent habitual
offenders already serving enhanced sentences in Louisiana prisons under
the authority of statutory provisions that are no longer in effect. 29 Thus,
these inmates are serving sentences that would be considered
unquestionably excessive under existing law if they were to be convicted
of the exact same crimes today.
In order to further remedy Louisiana’s problem of mass incarceration
and its burden on the state’s taxpayers, additional amendments must be
made to the state’s habitual-offender statute. The remedies currently
available are inadequate to assist these nonviolent habitual offenders in a
meaningful way. Thus, the legislature should further amend § 15:529.1 to
provide reviewing courts with discretionary authority to amend the
sentences of already-convicted nonviolent habitual offenders, in light of
the amendments in House Bill 518, so that their required prison terms may
more accurately reflect the sentencing guidelines currently in effect in the
statute.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.; see also Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
See PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23.
Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
Id.
Id.
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Part I of this Comment will examine the history of habitual-offender
statutes and mandatory-minimum sentencing in both the United States as
a whole and Louisiana more specifically. This historical backdrop of the
mandatory-minimum-sentencing and habitual-offender statutes will in
turn illustrate how the country arrived at its current mass incarceration
dilemma. Part II will discuss recent developments in criminal-justice
reform in Louisiana and the positive implications that these reforms will
have on the state’s issues of prison overcrowding. Additionally, this Part
will highlight some of the lingering problems inherent in these reforms
that will continue to hinder their ultimate goals. Finally, Part III will argue
that to adequately accomplish the stated goals of Louisiana’s criminaljustice reforms, the Louisiana Legislature must amend Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 15:529.1 beyond the measures included in House Bill 518 to
provide inmates sentenced under the pre-2019 version of Louisiana’s
habitual-offender statute with meaningful post-sentencing relief. To
support the need for such a solution, Part III will illustrate that the existing
remedies available to reduce prison sentences are ineffective in promptly
rectifying the state’s issues with mass incarceration.
I. THE TROUBLING HISTORY OF RECIDIVIST LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Recidivist laws permitting sentencing enhancements for repeat
offenders have existed throughout the United States since the country’s
establishment. 30 Though specifically enumerated habitual-offender
statutes did not arise until the early twentieth century, the existence of
early recidivist laws—such as mandatory-minimum sentences for repeat
offenders—provided state legislatures with the legal framework on which
they would eventually model their respective statutes. 31 Thus, to fully
understand the history of habitual-offender statutes in the United States, it
is necessary to examine the nation’s extensive history of seeking
heightened penalties for defendants found guilty of committing multiple
offenses. 32

30. See Abigail A. McNelis, Habitually Offending the Constitution: The
Cruel and Unusual Consequences of Habitual Offender Laws and Mandatory
Minimums, 28 CIV. RTS. L.J. 97, 101 (2017).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 100.
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A. History of Habitual-Offender Statutes in the United States
Habitual-offender statutes have existed in one form or another in the
United States since the 1920s, during the era of prohibition and rampant
organized crime. 33 The first incarnation of these recidivist laws came in
the form of the Baumes Law of 1926 in New York, which was enacted to
combat the state’s rising crime rates following World War I. 34 This version
of the New York law imposed a mandatory life sentence for offenders
convicted of a third felonious crime. 35 By 1948, almost every state had
followed New York’s example, enacting recidivist statutes that imposed
the possibility of extended sentences in cases where defendants were
convicted of subsequent and numerous felonies. 36 State legislatures
enacted these recidivist statutes to serve as a daunting deterrent to potential
career criminals and maintain a peaceful society by removing chronic lawbreakers from its communities.37
Though the aforementioned recidivist laws enacted in the early
twentieth century serve as the primary direct predecessors to the habitualoffender statutes that are currently in effect today, the ideological rationale
for such laws can be traced back further to the more general legal regime
of mandatory minimums. 38 Mandatory minimum provisions provide
judges with guidelines for sentencing defendants convicted of certain
enumerated offenses, namely by providing the lowest possible sentencing
lengths allowed for such charges. 39 As with habitual-offender statutes,
mandatory-minimum sentences are meant to deter potential criminals from
committing similar offenses. 40 These sentencing provisions historically
33. Paul W. Tappan, Habitual Offender Laws in the United States, 13 FED.
PROB. 28, 28 (1949).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. 29–31 (listing Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
37. Meredith S. Byars, State v. Muhammad: The Supreme Court of Louisiana
Restores Continuity to the Statutory Construction and Application of the Habitual
Offender Law, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2005) (citing State v. George, 48 So.
2d 265, 267 (La. 1950)).
38. McNelis, supra note 30, at 100.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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required judges to consider a number of different factors in determining
whether applying a statutory mandatory minimum was appropriate for
certain offenders, including a defendant’s prior criminal history. 41
Mandatory-minimum-sentencing guidelines are not new legal
regimes. 42 They existed as early as 1790 in the then newly established
United States. 43 Original versions of this sentencing scheme, however,
were generally only applied to the most serious offenses of the era, such
as piracy and murder. 44 Mandatory minimum guidelines, like Louisiana’s
habitual-offender statute today, adhere to strict sentencing formulas by
imposing exact penalties on convicted defendants whose conduct falls
under the statutes’ sentencing enhancement requirements. 45
However, despite the traditionally limited utilization of these
mandatory sentencing provisions, certain political and societal shifts in the
mid-twentieth century allowed for enhanced sentencing practices to be
extended to lower-level crimes at a much more frequent rate than in years
past. 46 In the 1970s, President Nixon’s “War on Drugs” began to develop
and expand rapidly. 47 During this time, the nation saw a staggering
increase in the statewide application of mandatory-minimum sentences for
a number of different drug offenses. 48 This increase was a byproduct of
the belief that such excessive sentences would serve as an effective

41. Id. More specifically,
[w]hen determining the applicability of a mandatory minimum for an
individual offender, judges consider objective criteria, such as the
quantity of drugs possessed or prior criminal history. Likewise,
mandatory minimum statutes adhere to strict formulas. For example, a
criminal convicted of crime A, such as possession with intent to sell,
must be sentenced to B years, subject to C condition, such as past felony
convictions.
Id. (citing Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 265–66 (2012)).
42. Id. at 101.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 100 (“For example, a criminal convicted of crime A, such as
possession with intent to sell, must be sentenced to B years, subject to C condition,
such as past felony convictions.”) (citing Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 265–66).
46. Louis Westerfield, A Study of the Louisiana Sentencing System and Its
Relationship to Prison Overcrowding: Some Realistic Solutions, 30 LOY. L. REV.
5, 11–12 (1984).
47. See United States v. Vasquez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32293, at *6–7
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010).
48. See Matthew C. Lamb, A Return to Rehabilitation: Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 41 J. LEGIS. 126, 127 (2014–2015).
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deterrent in the country’s perceived struggle with drug trafficking and
addiction. 49
The United States’ shift toward harsher application of mandatoryminimum sentences is largely attributable to the American public’s habit
of rousing itself into a fervor in fear of rising crime rates. 50 Some scholars
connect the American populace’s “crime phobia” at this time to figures
published in an FBI report compiled in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
which seemed to evidence an increase in violent-crime rates throughout
the country. 51 Critics of this FBI report note that the study was more than
likely inaccurate
from year to year because of “increased use of computers by the
police, changes in police departments’ crime reporting
procedures, shifts in public attitudes that result in the reporting of
more crimes, and an increasing number of people who insure[d]
their property and, thus, [had to] report to the police when [their
property was] stolen. 52
Regardless of the questionable methodology that the FBI employed in
formulating its analysis, the report was enough to push law-abiding
citizens to favor harsher penalties. 53
Criminal-justice scholars also note that this anti-crime movement was
further exacerbated by politicians and the news media of the time, which
sensationalized reports of increased crime rates for voter support and
increased viewership. 54 Political actors sought to garner support from the
voter base by delivering dramatic speeches detailing the degradation of
American society as a result of the nation’s supposedly incorrigible
criminal population, while at the same time emphasizing their status as
“law and order” candidates. 55 The news media of the time followed suit in
49. See id.
50. See Westerfield, supra note 46, at 12 (discussing the crime phobia of the
1970s’ effects on the country’s increasingly strict application of its mandatory
minimum statutory provisions) (citing K. KRAJIK & S. GETTINGER,
OVERCROWDED TIME 5 (1982)); see also ACLU, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 33 (2013) (detailing a resurgence of anticrime sentiments across the country in the 1990s and the ensuing increase in harsh
sentencing practices).
51. Westerfield, supra note 46, at 12 (citing K. KRAJIK & S. GETTINGER,
OVERCROWDED TIME 7 (1982)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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this endeavor by providing extensive coverage to a select number of
crimes committed against law-abiding citizens. 56 Extensive media
coverage, along with repetitive virtue signaling on the part of savvy
politicians, ultimately culminated to create an abundance of
unsympathetic criminal-justice policies throughout the United States,
implemented through both federal and state legislation. 57
Unfortunately, the true roots of the spike in crime during this era—
primarily drug and property crimes—were never truly addressed in a
meaningful way. 58 In regard to drug offenses, scholars note that many of
the factors inherently present in the nation’s drug epidemic, namely
addiction and desperation, largely prevent the mandatory-minimum
sentences applied to these cases from serving any meaningful purpose in
actually combating the nation’s drug affliction. 59 Similar problems in
mandatory-minimum-sentencing statutes can be attributed to their
application toward property crimes. 60 One scholar writes that increases in
property crimes can largely be attributed to deteriorating economic
conditions, which in turn drive desperate citizens to theft as a means of
supporting themselves, rather than any inherent trait of criminality. 61
The proliferation of mandatory-minimum-sentencing statutes caused
a staggering increase in the nation’s inmate population, straining already
overcrowded prison systems. 62 Though prison overcrowding was—and
still is—an issue afflicting states across the nation, no region exemplifies
this dilemma more than the American South.63 Further, while the South

56. Id.
57. Id. at 11 (“By 1982, at least 37 states had passed some form of mandatory
sentencing law, requiring imprisonment for a minimum length of time. Most of
these laws have been enacted [within the late seventies and early eighties].”).
58. McNelis, supra note 30, at 102.
59. Id. (citing Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences:
Exemplifying the Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935,
948 (2001)).
60. See Westerfield, supra note 46, at 14; see also State v. Bryant, 300 So. 3d
392, 393–94 (La. 2020) (“Pig Laws were largely designed to re-enslave African
Americans. They targeted actions such as stealing cattle and swine—considered
stereotypical ‘negro’ behavior—by lowering the threshold for what constituted a
crime and increasing the severity of its punishment . . . this case demonstrates
their modern manifestation”).
61. See Westerfield, supra note 46, at 14.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 7 (“Beginning in 1970, the national prison population increased by
43 percent; this increase was especially dramatic in the South.”) (citing 1 J.
MULLEN, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS: SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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stood out with regard to prison overcrowding in the 1970s, Louisiana’s
own incarceration rate was substantially disproportionate in its own
right. 64
In 1978, a survey of prison populations across various states “revealed
that, although Louisiana [was] ranked number nine in population density
[among the states examined], it [was] ranked number seven in prison
population and sixth in the number of total persons incarcerated.” 65 In the
years following, Louisiana’s problem with prison overcrowding continued
to grow, increasing by 21% from 1981 to 1982 and raising the total number
of prisoners in the state per 100,000 civilians to 251 by the end of the
year. 66 One of the largest contributors to Louisiana’s overcrowded prison
system is the state’s habitual-offender law, which is one of the state’s most
frequently utilized forms of mandatory-minimum sentencing. 67
B. History of the Habitual-Offender Law in Louisiana: Louisiana
Recidivist Law in the Early Twentieth Century
The Louisiana Legislature promulgated the state’s first version of its
habitual-offender law in 1928. 68 As was common with most federal and
state legislatures’ goals in enacting recidivist laws across the United
States, the Louisiana Legislature’s stated purpose in drafting its habitualoffender statute was to “discourage repeated criminal behavior and to

OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 15 (1980)). For further explanation of the South’s prison
population increase, see MULLEN, supra note 63, at 15–16 (1980):
By 1968, the South, which had previously held about 36 percent of the
nation’s state prisoners, began to increase its share. By 1978, this region
held almost half of all state prisoners in the U.S., . . . although it
contained less than one-third of the U.S. population. While the remainder
of the nation had increased its state prison population by 31 percent
between 1970 and 1978, the South showed an increase of 84 percent. In
the South, the number of persons per 100,000 in state prisons was more
than twice as great as the number in the Northeast and 93 percent higher
than the average for the other three regions. The number of prisoners in
the South was not only disproportionate to its share of the civilian
population but also to its share of serious . . . [violent] crime.
Id.
64. See Westerfield, supra note 46, at 8.
65. Id. (citing MULLEN, supra note 63, at 17 (1980)).
66. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., PRISONERS IN 1982 (April 1983)).
67. Id. at 29.
68. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 934; 1928 La. Acts 15.
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protect society by removing the persistent offenders from its midst.”69 This
early version of the statute was particularly harsh, requiring that the
minimum sentence imposed on a second-time offender be at least as long
as the maximum sentence available for a first conviction. 70 Additionally,
while the minimum sentence the statute prescribed for third-time offenders
was required to equal the maximum sentence allowed for a second
conviction, fourth-time felony offenders were required to spend the rest of
their natural lives in prison.71
Louisiana legal scholar Donald V. Wilson illustrated one such
example of the unquestionably harsh outcomes of Louisiana’s 1928
habitual-offender statute in the following hypothetical. 72 Consider, “[f]or
example, the least possible sentence that could be imposed on an offender
convicted for the second time of a larceny of over twenty dollars was
imprisonment for ten years. A life sentence was mandatory for the
individual convicted four times of a larceny of over twenty dollars.”73
Moreover, when the circumstances of a defendant’s conviction required
the statute to be applied, sentencing judges were granted no discretion
under the language of the statute to decrease the length of the prescribed
sentence, creating an abundance of disproportionately harsh mandatory
prison terms. 74 During this era, defendants and their attorneys consistently
called upon the Board of Pardons to grant some form of reprieve to these
unjustifiably punished defendants. 75 The uncompromising structure of the
1928 statute ultimately created defects in the statute’s practical
applicability, with many parishes applying the statute inconsistently and
others electing to not use it at all as a result of judicial objections over its
undue severity. 76
In order to remedy the 1928 habitual-offender statute’s issues of
practicability—and to promote uniformity and equitability in
sentencing—the Louisiana Legislature amended the statute in 1942. 77 The
1942 amendment to Louisiana’s habitual-offender law reduced the
69. S. Renee Bourg, The Louisiana Habitual Offender Statute: When the
Time Doesn’t Fit the Crime, 54 LOY. L. REV. 941, 946 (2008).
70. Donald V. Wilson, The Louisiana Criminal Code: Making the
Punishment Fit the Criminal, 5 LA. L. REV. 53, 61 (1942) (citing 1928 La. Acts
15).
71. Westerfield, supra note 46, at 29.
72. See Wilson, supra note 70, at 61.
73. Id. (citing 1928 La. Act 15).
74. See Westerfield, supra note 46, at 30.
75. Wilson, supra note 70, at 61.
76. Id.
77. Westerfield, supra note 46, at 30.
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statutorily prescribed lengths for minimum and maximum penalties, while
also providing that habitual offenders were henceforth eligible for parole
after serving one-third of their sentence. 78 One of the most notable
additions the 1942 amendment made to the habitual-offender statute was
the inclusion of a five-year elapse period provision, “making the statute
inapplicable when more than five years had elapsed between the expiration
of the sentence imposed for the previous felony and the date of
commission of the subsequent felony.”79 A nearly identical provision
providing defendants with a protective elapse period in between felonies
can be found in Louisiana’s current habitual-offender statute, as will be
discussed in greater detail below. 80
C. The Habitual-Offender Law in Louisiana: Post “War on Drugs” Era
Though the Louisiana Legislature amended various aspects of the
state’s habitual-offender law a number of times following the 1942
amendment, the statute’s current structure—located in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 15:529.1—can be traced back to the resurgence of the anticrime movement in the 1990s.81 As stated above, crime spikes throughout
the United States in the 1970s, along with sensationalized media reports
on the prevalence of drug-related violence, led federal and state
legislatures to adopt strict mandatory-minimum sentences for many
nonviolent offenses. 82 The public’s anti-crime sentiment during the 1970s
only increased over the following decades, reaching somewhat of a
pinnacle in the 1990s. 83 In response to this public outcry over elevated
crime rates, state legislatures, en masse, began to extensively adopt strict
three-strike and habitual-offender laws to combat the nation’s perceived
rising criminal population. 84
The current version of Louisiana’s habitual-offender law contained in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:529.1—aside from the post-2019
amendments to the law that will be discussed in greater detail below—is
78. Bourg, supra note 69, at 946.
79. Westerfield, supra note 46, at 30 (citing 1942 La. Acts 45).
80. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(1) (2021).
81. Byars, supra note 37, at 1562; see also Samara Marion, Justice by
Geography? A Study of San Diego County’s Three Strikes Sentencing Practices
from July-December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 29, 30 (1999); see also
Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 409–22 (1997).
82. ACLU, supra note 50, at 33.
83. Id.
84. McNelis, supra note 30, at 106.
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largely a product of this 1990s crime-wave hysteria. 85 The basic
framework of § 15:529.1 is as follows:
[I]f a person is convicted of a felony, then subsequently commits
another felony, the punishment for the subsequent conviction may
be enhanced. The precise range of possible penalties are set out by
the statute and depend upon the nature of the offense and the
number of previous convictions. By virtue of the law itself, a
person so sentenced is ineligible for probation or suspension of
sentence, and if the underlying offense has further prohibitions,
i.e., no parole eligibility, those prohibitions apply to the enhanced
sentence as well. 86
Further, whether a defendant’s sentence will be enhanced is entirely
within the discretion of the presiding district attorney. 87 If the district
attorney decides to initiate such an action, then the state must prove that
the defendant was in fact convicted of a prior felony in a separate hearing
through a factual showing of said prior conviction’s existence. 88
Additionally, subsection C of § 15:529.1 provides that a defendant may
not be charged as a habitual offender if a certain amount of time has passed
in between the previous felony conviction and the subsequent felony
offense currently being charged. 89 These elapse periods range from five to
ten years depending on the nature of the prior felonies. 90 In effect, this
provision requires the prosecutor to establish that such a cleansing period
has not accrued between the defendant’s prior convictions and the
subsequent felony currently being prosecuted in order to charge the
defendant as a habitual offender. 91 If such a time period has elapsed, then
the defendant will not qualify as a habitual offender. 92 However, if the
district attorney is able to establish that the defendant is eligible for
habitual-offender status, then the trial court is effectively deprived of any
sentencing discretion it may have otherwise possessed, thereby forcing the
85. Byars, supra note 37, at 1562; see also Marion, supra note 81, at 30;
Vitiello, supra note 81, at 409–22.
86. GAIL DALTON SCHLOSSER, LOUISIANA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 26:7
(4th ed. 2020).
87. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) (2021); see also SCHLOSSER,
supra note 86, at § 26:7
88. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(D)(1)(b) (2021); see also SCHLOSSER,
supra note 86, at § 26:7.
89. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(1) (2021).
90. Id.
91. See id.; see also SCHLOSSER, supra note 86, at § 26:7.
92. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(1) (2021).
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court to vacate any sentence it may have previously adjudicated in favor
of a new sentence that aligns with the statutorily prescribed time ranges
provided in § 15:529.1. 93
D. Mass Incarceration in Both the United States and Louisiana
As a result of mandatory-minimum-sentencing laws, with habitualoffender statutes being one of the most commonly utilized forms, the
number of incarcerated persons in the United States has nearly quadrupled
over the past 40 years. 94 Though mandatory-minimum statutes and
habitual-offender laws were originally intended to combat rises in violentcrime rates, 95 a 2013 American Civil Liberties Union report revealed that
a large number of inmates currently sentenced to life without parole as a
result of prior convictions were convicted of low-level, nonviolent
offenses, 96 mostly drug-related and property crimes, which numerous
commentors have linked to poverty and addiction. 97
Mass incarceration is an especially prevalent issue in Louisiana, which
has the one of the highest rates of prisoners serving life sentences without
parole for nonviolent offenses. 98 These high rates of nonviolent offenders
sentenced to excessively long prison terms in Louisiana are largely a
byproduct of the state’s enthusiastic use of its habitual-offender statute. 99
The fact that the maximum penalties enforced under § 15:529.1 are
frequently only enhancements of the mandatory-minimum sentences in the
state’s more specific criminal statutes—which standing alone are some of
the most severe in the country—supports this contention. 100
Prior to 2019, Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute imposed enhanced
sentences on defendants convicted of subsequent violent felonies as well
as subsequent nonviolent felonies. 101 Under the authority of this pre-2019
93. See id.; see also SCHLOSSER, supra note 86, at § 26:7.
94. McNelis, supra note 30, at 100 (citing ACLU, supra note 50, at 32).
95. Id. at 106.
96. Id. at 105 (citing ACLU, supra note 50, at 18, 21).
97. See State v. Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392, 393 (La. 2020).
98. McNelis, supra note 30, at 106 (citing ACLU, supra note 50, at 23)
(noting also that additional southern states such as Florida, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Oklahoma have exceedingly high rates of
prisoners serving life sentences without parole for nonviolent offenses as well).
99. Id.
100. See Fritchie, supra note 18, at 935 (citing Lauren Galik & Julian Morris,
Smart on Sentencing, Smart on Crime: An Argument for Reforming Louisiana’s
Determinate Sentencing Laws, REASON FOUND. 6 (2013)).
101. Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
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version, state courts most frequently enhanced terms of imprisonment for
defendants convicted of possession of a Schedule II narcotic. 102 In fact,
nearly 64% of inmates currently serving enhanced sentences in Louisiana
prisons under the habitual-offender statute are imprisoned for nonviolent
offenses. 103 Nearly 20% these nonviolent offenders were convicted of drug
possession. 104 Under the strict sentencing guidelines of Louisiana’s
habitual-offender statute, the Louisiana prison population expanded to
around 40,000 incarcerated citizens in 2012. 105 In 2013, Louisiana’s
criminal-justice system placed 847 out of every 100,000 Louisiana citizens
in prison, making Louisiana the most incarcerated state in the nation with
an incarceration rate sitting at 114% above the national average. 106
Though the state implemented statutory and administrative changes
between 2012 and 2015 that somewhat reduced the number of inmates in
state prisons, Louisiana maintained the highest incarceration rate per
capita in the United States during that period.107 The negative effects of
the state’s high incarceration rate notably manifested in the form of
excessive costs to Louisiana taxpayers. 108 In 2012, Louisiana’s rising
prison population, which had more than doubled since 1990, 109 forced the
state to spend nearly $729.9 million on adult correctional services. 110
Despite the aforementioned statutory and administrative changes
promulgated between 2012 and 2015, state legislators still appropriated
$625 million for correctional expenditures in 2017. 111
Additionally, Louisiana’s mandatory-minimum-sentencing laws have
negative effects beyond mass incarceration and the ensuing burden on
102. LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS., supra note 21, at 1 (citing PEW,
LOUISIANA DATA ANALYSIS PART II, supra note 21).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23, at
3 (citing data collected from the Louisiana Department of Corrections and the
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics).
106. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 935.
107. PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23, at
3 (citing data collected from the Louisiana Department of Corrections and the
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics).
108. Id.
109. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 935 (citing Population Trends—Raw Data:
1989–2015, LA. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY & CORR., https://doc.louisiana.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/jan.19.bb.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WKH-TNBB] (last
modified Dec. 31, 2012)).
110. Id.
111. PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23, at
3.
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state taxpayers. 112 Following an analysis of crime statistics in the state, the
ACLU determined that the mandatory sentence that Louisiana law
requires for a conviction of possession of marijuana disproportionately
affects African Americans. 113 This imbalance in the allocation of penalties
for minor drug offenses exists despite there being no noteworthy statistical
difference in African Americans’ use of marijuana compared to other
races. 114
Another troublesome byproduct of Louisiana’s habitual-offender
statute is that it gives district attorneys undue prosecutorial leverage. 115
Prosecutors utilize this leverage to secure plea deals from defendants in
place of proceeding to formal trials. 116 When threatened with an extended
sentence as a habitual offender, defendants are more likely to agree to
disproportionate sentences in order to avoid receiving a potentially
decades-long prison term at trial. 117 This problem is not isolated to
Louisiana alone though, as data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics
indicates that nearly 94% of felony convictions in state courts arise out of
plea deals. 118 In Louisiana, the average sentence range for inmates
convicted as habitual offenders is 34.5 years, while the average sentence
term for the total prison population is only 16.5 years. 119 To maintain this
prosecutorial power, district attorney organizations, along with state
sheriffs who profit off of high incarceration rates, have stymied a number
of legislative bills aimed at reforming the state’s mandatory sentencing
practices. 120

112. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 936.
113. Id. (citing THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION 153 (2013)).
114. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2013
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL
FINDINGS 88 (2014).
115. LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS., supra note 21.
116. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 936 (citing Martin Kaste, States Push for
Prison Sentence Overhaul; Prosecutors Push Back, NPR (July 9, 2014, 3:32 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2014/07/09/329587949/states-push-for-prison-sentence-re
form-and-prosecutors-push-back [https://perma.cc/3SF4-LFKG]).
117. LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS, supra note 21.
118. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2006 (2009)).
119. Id. (citing LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., BRIEFING BOOK (2018)).
120. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 936–37.
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II. INSUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING AMENDMENTS TO LOUISIANA’S
HABITUAL-OFFENDER STATUTE
Despite the efforts of some prosecutors and sheriffs to block
legislative reforms,121 a number of state governmental actors recently
came together in an effort to remedy some of the detrimental effects that
the severe provisions of § 15:529.1 and other various criminal statutes
have brought onto the state. 122 In 2017, Governor John Bel Edwards,
working in conjunction with a bipartisan coalition of state legislators and
representatives from the Department of Corrections, called for reforms to
the Louisiana criminal justice system with the goal of eliminating
Louisiana’s status as the most incarcerated state per capita in the country
and, in turn, reducing the burden on state taxpayers. 123 Thus, in 2017,
Governor Edwards signed into law ten criminal-justice reform bills. 124 As
part of this ten-bill package, state legislators reduced habitual-offender
penalties by: (1) reducing mandatory-minimum sentencing for most
second and third offenses, while also providing courts with the discretion
to disregard minimum sentences enumerated in the habitual-offender
statute if they deem them to be cruel and unusual; (2) eliminating the
possibility of life sentences for defendants convicted of a fourth nonviolent
conviction; and (3) shortening the time that must elapse before a felony
can no longer be used for enhancement purposes for nonviolent
subsequent offenses. 125
Louisiana legislators took a step further in reducing the severity of the
habitual-offender statute in 2019 with House Bill 518. 126 This bill
amended the habitual-offender statute by declaring that a felony offense
that is not a crime of violence as defined by Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 14:2(B) and that has been set aside and dismissed pursuant to Code of
Criminal Procedure article 893(E)(2),(3), or (4) shall not be considered a
prior conviction for the purpose of enhancing a defendant’s sentence for a
subsequent nonviolent felony. 127 Additionally, House Bill 518 states that
a trial court may not consider a defendant’s set-aside-and-dismissed prior
nonviolent felony offenses for the purpose of computing the statute’s five121. Id. at 938.
122. See PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note
23, at 1.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id.; see also S.B. 220, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017); S.B. 221, 2017
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017).
126. Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
127. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(3) (2021).
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year elapse period if the defendant’s subsequent felony conviction is also
a nonviolent offense. 128 The habitual-offender statute’s elapse period
provides that once a certain period of time has passed—usually five
years—in which a defendant has received no criminal convictions, then
the state may no longer prosecute said defendant as a habitual offender. 129
Thus, under the authority of the amendments House Bill 518 enacted into
§ 15:529.1, prior nonviolent felony offenses may no longer interrupt a
defendant’s five-year elapse period. 130
A. Problems with Recent Reforms
Despite the steps the Louisiana Legislature has taken in combating the
state’s high incarceration rate, one issue arising out of the habitualoffender statute’s reformed provisions still remains. Pursuant to
subsection K(1) of § 15:529.1, “notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were
in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was
committed.” 131 Thus, it can be inferred that the amended provisions of the
habitual-offender statute only operate prospectively. 132
Louisiana appellate court jurisprudence regarding the applicability of
statutory amendments in sentencing certain defendants supports this
inference. 133 For example, in State v. Surry, the Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal reviewed the district court’s sentencing of defendant
Alexander Surry, who was seeking supervisory review for the denial of his
motion to correct an illegal sentence. 134 Surry was sentenced to life
imprisonment at hard labor without the possibility of parole for his
conviction of cocaine possession with intent to distribute, based on his
status as a third-felony habitual offender. 135
128. Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
129. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(1) (2021).
130. Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 15:529.1(C)(3) (2021).
131. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
132. Id.
133. See State v. Surry, 121 So. 3d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013); see also
State v. Buhcannon, 119 So. 3d 853 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2013) (in which the
court concluded that a prior felony conviction for solicitation of a crime against
nature that was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor by the Louisiana
Legislature can nevertheless serve as a felony for enhancement of a defendant’s
sentence under the habitual-offender statute).
134. Surry, 121 So. 3d at 805.
135. Id.
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Surry was sentenced under the version of the habitual-offender statute
in effect at the time of the commission of his third felony offense in
January 2001. 136 At that time, § 15:529.1 prescribed a mandatory life
sentence
when any one of the offender’s three previous felony convictions:
[1] was defined in La. R.S. § 14:2(13) as a crime of violence; or
[2] was a violation of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Law
punishable by imprisonment for more than five years; or [3] was
any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 12
years. 137
Later that year, however, the Louisiana Legislature amended § 15:529.1
to only mandate a life sentence without benefit of parole when
all three prior felony convictions fall into at least one of these
categories: [1] any crime of violence, as defined under La. R.S.
14:2(B); a sex offense, as defined under La. R.S. 15:540, et seq.,
when the victim is under the age of 18 at the time of the crime; [2]
a drug offense punishable by 10 years or more; or [3] any other
conviction punishable by imprisonment for 12 years or more. 138
Under the amended version of the habitual-offender statute in effect at
the time of his appellate hearing, Surry would not have been subject to a
life sentence without parole because one of his felony convictions for
cocaine possession was punishable by no more than five years. 139 Despite
the new sentencing guidelines, the Second Circuit determined that the
changes made to the habitual-offender statute alone did not provide Surry
with any form of post-sentencing relief. 140 The Second Circuit based its
determination on a line of Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence
holding, generally, that the law in effect at the time of the commission of
a defendant’s offense dictates the extent of the prescribed penalty.141
So while the amendments provided in House Bill 518 will
hypothetically reduce the number of Louisiana citizens incarcerated for
nonviolent felony offenses in the future, it does nothing to decrease the
136. Id.
137. Id. (bold type removed).
138. Id. (bold type removed).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 805–06 (citing State v. Sugasti, 820 So. 2d 518 (La. 2002); State v.
Wright, 384 So. 2d 399, 401 (La. 1980); State v. Narcisse, 426 So. 2d 118, 130–
31 (La. 1983)).
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substantial number of inmates already serving time whose sentences were
enhanced under the old version of the statute. 142 As stated above, the
majority of prisoners serving extended time in Louisiana state prisons
under the habitual-offender statute are nonviolent offenders. 143 Looking to
the burden on state taxpayers resulting from the imprisonment of habitual
offenders alone, it is estimated that the cost to detain prisoners in Louisiana
is over $21,000 per prisoner each year. 144 For example, in 2019, because
an estimated 64% of the 5,000 people serving time in Louisiana under the
habitual-offender statute were there for nonviolent crimes 145 it cost the
state, and thus taxpayers, roughly $67.2 million per year to hold those
nonviolent offenders, most of whom were sentenced under statutory
provisions no longer in effect.
B. Ineffectiveness of Currently Available Forms of Post-Sentencing
Relief
While the prospective amendments enacted in House Bill 518 fail to
readily assist already-convicted habitual offenders, there are some existing
avenues for post-conviction relief available to these inmates. 146 The two
most frequently utilized forms of such relief are parole and diminution of
sentences based on good behavior, or “good time” as it is more commonly
called. 147 As part of the 2017 Louisiana Criminal Justice Reform Act, the
state legislature expanded parole eligibility for habitual offenders
convicted of nonviolent offenses by decreasing the amount of time such
defendants must serve before the state parole board may examine their
case from 33% to 25% of sentence served. 148 The Act similarly expanded
habitual offenders’ eligibility for “good time” release by reducing the
required percentage of sentence already served from 40% to 35%. 149 A
third, but less common, form of relief available to habitual offenders is
through appellate review, where defendants challenge their prison
142. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
143. LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS., supra note 21.
144. Id. (citing LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., supra note 119).
145. Id.
146. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4 (2021); id. § 15:571.3; see also Erick V.
Anderson, Appellate Review of Excessive Sentences in Non-Capital Cases, 42 LA.
L. REV. 1080, 1081 (1982).
147. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4 (2021); id. § 15:571.3.
148. PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23, at
13; S.B. 139, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017); LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4 (2021).
149. PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23, at
13; S.B. 139, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2017); LA. REV. STAT. § 15:571.3 (2021).
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sentences based on the constitutional Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 150 However, as will be illustrated
in the subsections below, these existing mechanisms for post-sentencing
relief are wholly inadequate, and sometimes completely ineffective, in
providing these habitual offenders with a meaningful remedy.
1. Parole and Good Time
Though parole and “good time” releases seem like viable options for
remedying the state’s overloaded prison population, a closer look at the
application of these forms of relief shows that their underlying
ameliorative effect is lacking. 151 Looking again at the fact that in 2019 the
majority of habitual offenders in Louisiana prisons were nonviolent
offenders, it follows that these inmates were convicted prior to the
effectuation of the 2019 amendments to § 15:529.1. 152 Thus, the amount
of time these prisoners were sentenced to as a result of the pre-2019
version of the statute is no longer congruent with the sentencing guidelines
promulgated in the most current version of the statute. 153 The required
amount of time that a nonviolent offender sentenced under prior versions
of the statute must serve to meet the 25% threshold for parole eligibility is
inherently longer than it would be for repeat offenders convicted of the
same nonviolent crimes today. 154 The same issue arises when considering
the effectiveness of early releases for good behavior. 155
For example, imagine that Thomas was convicted as a second-felony
nonviolent habitual offender for possession with intent to distribute of two
and a half pounds of marijuana, a Schedule I narcotic, on July 1, 2019, in
a Louisiana state court. Thomas was thereafter sentenced to twelve years
imprisonment pursuant to the versions of Louisiana’s habitual-offender
and drug-possession statutes in effect at the time. 156 Because Thomas was
sentenced after the passage of the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 2017,
he will only have to serve 25% of his sentence to be considered for parole
eligibility as a non-violent offender. 157 Nevertheless, Thomas was
sentenced prior to the enactment of House Bill 518, so he still received a
150. See Anderson, supra note 146.
151. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4 (2021); see also id. § 15:571.3.
152. LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS., supra note 21, at 1.
153. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(3) (2021).
154. Id. § 15:574.4; id. § 15:529.1(C)(3).
155. Id. § 15:571.3; id § 15:529.1(C)(3).
156. See id. § 15:529.1(A)(1) (Aug. 1, 2018–July 31, 2019); id.
§ 40:966(B)(2)(b) (Aug. 1, 2018–July 1, 2019).
157. Id. § 15:574.4.
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substantial sentence enhancement as a habitual offender. 158 Thus, Thomas
would need to serve 25% of his twelve-year sentence to obtain parole
eligibility. As a result, Thomas would need to serve at least three years
before the state’s parole board could even consider his eligibility for
sentencing review. 159
Now consider that Thomas, instead, did not commit his second-felony
offense until August 2, 2019. After his arrest in early August, Thomas was
convicted for his felony offense in September 2019 and sentenced to four
years imprisonment in accordance with the drug possession statute in
effect at the time. 160 Thomas’s sentence would be far shorter in this second
scenario because he did not commit his second-felony offense until August
2, 2019, a day after the effectuation of the House Bill 518 version of the
state’s habitual-offender statute. Pursuant to these amendments, the
prosecutor handling his case would not be able to charge Thomas as a
habitual offender despite the offense being his second nonviolent
felony. 161 Needing only serve 25% of his four-year sentence, Thomas
would only have to serve one year of his sentence before becoming eligible
for review by the state’s parole board. 162 In sum, the disparity in the
required amount of time that Thomas would have to serve before he is
eligible for parole review in these two separate, but nearly identical,
scenarios simply boils down to a difference in which month of 2019 he
was arrested and convicted. 163
Nonviolent habitual offenders convicted and sentenced under the preHouse Bill 518 version of the habitual-offender statute face a similar
disparity in the percentage of sentence served that is required for good time
release eligibility, with an even higher percentage threshold of 35% as
opposed to the 25% required for parole. 164 Additionally inmates are
vulnerable to a number of other obstacles in seeking early releases under
both the parole and “good time” statutes, such as minor disciplinary
infractions during the time of their incarceration. 165 For example, the

158. See id. § 15:529.1(A)(1) (Aug. 1, 2018–July 31, 2019).
159. See id. § 15:574.4 (2020).
160. Id. § 40:966(B)(2)(b) (Aug. 1, 2019–July 31, 2020).
161. Id. § 15:529.1(C)(3) (2020).
162. See id. § 15:574.4.
163. See id. § 15:547.4; id. § 15:529.1(C)(3); id. § 15:529.1(A)(1) (Aug. 1,
2018–July 31, 2019); id § 40:966(B)(2)(b) (Aug. 1, 2019–July 31, 2020).
164. See id. § 15:571.3 (2020); id. § 15:574.4.1.
165. Lea Skene, He Got Life for Stealing Hedge Clippers Under Louisiana’s
Habitual Offender Law. Now He’s Free After 24 Years, ADVOC., https://
www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_4ef13e22-0efa-11eb-b5e0-27d
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state’s parole board denied 62-year-old, habitual offender Fair Wayne
Bryant’s request for parole in 2019—after Bryant had already served
nearly 23 years of his sentence—on account of a prison disciplinary
infraction he received in 2018 for being caught with a cigarette, despite
the fact that it was Bryant’s only writeup in the preceding five years.166
Though the board eventually granted Bryant parole in October 2020, the
aforementioned tribulations he faced illustrate that even a misstep as minor
as being caught with a cigarette in prison can serve as a major obstacle for
any habitual offender seeking an early release through parole or the good
time statute. 167
Further, the negative effects of being sentenced under the prior version
of § 15:529.1 don’t end at release. In Louisiana, parole allows for an
inmate to be released from prison earlier than their sentence originally
required based on the parole board’s determination “that the prisoner is
able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen so that
[they] can be released without detriment to the community or to
[themselves].” 168 However, the prisoner must still serve the remainder of
their sentence in the community under the direct supervision of the state’s
Department of Corrections. 169 Thus, even if a nonviolent habitual offender
is granted an early release from prison through parole, they are not truly
“released” from continuous state supervision. 170 Instead of truly receiving
some form of ameliorative relief, paroled nonviolent habitual offenders
sentenced under the pre-2019 version of § 15:529.1 will nevertheless be
obligated to serve the remainder of their prolonged sentences, simply in a
new location and under different circumstances. 171

b0371d9f8.html [https://perma.cc/G97L-Q3TT] (last updated Oct. 15, 2020, 5:22
PM).
166. Id.
167. See generally id.
168. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2021).
169. See LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, PAROLE IN LOUISIANA, https://
doc.louisiana.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/PAROLE-IN-LOUISIANA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJ48-2KKA]; see also Brittany Williams, Comment, The
Underbelly of the Criminal Justice System: A Critique and Proposed Reform of
Parole Hearings in Louisiana, 81 LA. L. REV. 1569 (2020).
170. See id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(C)(3) (2021).
171. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1 (2021); see also LA. BD. OF PARDONS &
PAROLE, supra note 169.
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2. Constitutional Eighth Amendment Reviews
Another avenue for sentencing reconsideration available to nonviolent
offenders sentenced under older versions of Louisiana’s habitual-offender
statute is through appellate review of their sentence based on the
constitutional prohibition of excessive punishment. 172 However, as recent
Louisiana appellate jurisprudence evidences, courts are hesitant to grant
writs of review to consider the constitutional excessiveness of sentences
enhanced under the habitual-offender statute. 173 In instances where
appellate courts do find sentences prescribed under § 15:529.1 excessive,
it is usually under circumstances in which defendants were exposed to
mandatory minimum life sentences. 174 However, as the following
discussion of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v.
Bryant illustrates, even exposure to unduly harsh life sentences is not a
guarantee of constitutional review or sentence reductions for habitual
offenders. 175
In State v. Bryant, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Fair Wayne
Bryant’s writ application for review of his life sentence arising out of his
status as a habitual offender without providing any explanation. 176 His life
sentence first arose out of an incident in 1997 in which Bryant was arrested
for unsuccessfully attempting to steal a pair of hedge clippers. 177
Following his conviction at trial, Bryant was sentenced to life
imprisonment under the habitual-offender law based on his four prior
felony convictions. 178
172. See Anderson, supra note 146, at 1081.
173. See State v. Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392 (La. 2020); State v. Noble, 133 So.
3d 703, 705–06 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014); State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d 672
(La. 1998); State v. Morgan, 673 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996); State v.
Calhoun, 776 So. 2d 1188 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000); State v. Ricks, 823 So. 2d
441 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
174. See State v. Hayes, 739 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999) (in which
the court held defendant’s statutorily prescribed life sentence for theft over $500
as a third-felony habitual offender excessive); State v. Burns, 723 So. 2d 1013
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1998) (wherein the court vacated defendant’s mandatory
life sentence for a fourth-felony conviction of possession and distribution of
cocaine on grounds that it was constitutionally excessive); State v. Neal, 762 So.
2d 281 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a mandatory life sentence under
the habitual-offender statute as a fourth-felony offender for theft of goods valued
between $100 to $500 was constitutionally excessive).
175. See Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392, 393–95.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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While one of Bryant’s prior convictions was a crime of violence—an
attempted armed robbery conviction in 1979, 18 years earlier—the
remainder of his subsequent convictions were nonviolent crimes, which
the sole dissenting justice referred to as “crimes of poverty.” 179 Bryant’s
three nonviolent felony convictions included possession of stolen things,
attempted forgery of a check worth $150, and simple burglary of an
inhabited dwelling. 180 In her lone dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Johnson noted that “[i]t is cruel and unusual to impose a sentence of life
in prison at hard labor for . . . criminal behavior which is most often caused
by poverty or addiction.” 181
Chief Justice Johnson additionally noted the excessive expenses
placed on state taxpayers as a result of the Louisiana’s harsh sentencing
scheme. 182 The justice noted that “[s]ince his conviction in 1997, Mr.
Bryant’s incarceration has cost Louisiana taxpayers approximately
$518,667.” 183 Justice Johnson further noted that because Bryant is
currently 60 years old, Louisiana taxpayers would have to pay an
additional one million dollars to punish Bryant for his failed attempt to
steal a pair of hedge trimmers if he were to live another 20 years in state
confinement. 184 Though public sentiment overwhelmingly agreed with
Justice Johnson’s opinion on the matter, 185 the majority of the Louisiana
Supreme Court nevertheless elected to deny Bryant’s application for
review without providing an explanation for its ruling. 186 While the Bryant
opinion shows that Louisiana courts are hesitant to grant appellate review
of even the most severe sentences enhanced under the habitual-offender
law, additional jurisprudence illustrates that courts are even less likely to
179. Id.
180. Id. at 393.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing data compiled by the Louisiana Department of Corrections for
the fiscal year of 2019–2020 showing that the average cost per day of
incarcerating one person is $62.49).
184. Id.
185. See Amanda Holpuch, Louisiana Court Upholds Black Man’s Life
Sentence for Trying to Steal Hedge Clippers, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/07/lousiana-court-denies-life-sen
tence-appeal-fair-wayne-bryant-black-man-hedge-clippers [https://perma.cc/ZJV98MGG]; see also Teo Armus, He Got Life for Stealing Hedge Clippers. The
Louisiana Supreme Court Says It’s a Fair Sentence., WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/05/louisiana-supreme-court-lifesentence/ [https://perma.cc/GT8B-DYNV].
186. Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392.
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grant reviews based on constitutional excessiveness for some of the more
minor enhanced sentences imposed under § 15:529.1. 187
In State v. Noble, a man was convicted for possessing two marijuana
cigarettes in 2011, his fourth conviction for marijuana possession.188
Under the Louisiana law in effect at the time, a fourth conviction for
simple possession of marijuana was considered a felony. 189 Because Noble
was convicted for three prior nonviolent felony drug offenses, the state
was allowed to prosecute him as a habitual offender under the version of
the statute in effect at the time.190 Despite the mandatory minimum 13year sentence that Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute required, 191 the
trial judge sentenced Noble to only five-years imprisonment at hard
labor. 192
After the trial court made this discretionary decision, the state filed a
writ application with the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal arguing
that the defendant and trial court provided an insufficient showing to
garner a deviation from the statutorily prescribed mandatory-minimum
sentence. 193 The Fourth Circuit elected to affirm the five-year sentence,
finding that Noble had sufficiently proven that the 13-year minimum was
constitutionally excessive. 194 The state then appealed the Fourth Circuit’s
ruling to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed and vacated Noble’s five-year sentence based on its own
determination that the mandatory-minimum sentence was not
constitutionally excessive. 195 The Court arrived at this determination after
a finding that the trial judge’s justifications for deviating from the statutory
minimum—which described the detrimental effects on Noble’s family and
noted the lack of severity of Noble’s primarily drug-related criminal
history—were insufficient to show that Noble’s circumstances were

187. Anderson, supra note 146, at 1092.
188. Fritchie, supra note 18, at. 933 (citing State v. Noble, 133 So. 3d 703,
705–06 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 934 (“Noble’s previous felony convictions for nonviolent drug
offenses in 1991 and 2003 allowed the state to prosecute him under Louisiana’s
habitual offender law as a third-felony offender, which carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of thirteen years and four months’ imprisonment”) (citing
Noble, 133 So. 3d at 705–06).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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exceptional enough to warrant a deviation from the statutorily authorized
mandatory-minimum sentence. 196
The Louisiana Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial
court, and the court resentenced Noble to a term of 13 years and four
months. 197 Noble subsequently appealed this new sentence to the Fourth
Circuit, arguing that his sentence was excessive under the Louisiana
Constitution, Article I, Section 2, which prohibits the imposition of
excessive punishment. 198 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing Noble to the mandatory
minimum of 13 years and four months, as this prison-term was in line with
the prescribed sentencing guidelines promulgated in the version of the
state’s habitual-offender statute in effect at the time.199
Further examination of appellate court jurisprudence shows that the
outcome presented in State v. Noble does not stand alone in its showing
that nonviolent habitual offenders are unlikely to receive any form of
reprieve from the Louisiana appellate court system.200 For example, in
State v. Johnson, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial court’s
reduction of the defendant’s sentence from the mandatory minimum of 20
years imprisonment to 30 months based on the defendant’s nonviolent
criminal history was not justified.201 Additionally, in State v. Morgan, the
Fourth Circuit held that the trial court erred in deviating from the
statutorily prescribed mandatory-minimum sentence of 20-years
imprisonment by instead sentencing the defendant to only 7 years. 202 The
Morgan court noted that, like in the Noble case, the trial judge failed to
specify any adequate factual justification for deviating from the statutorily
prescribed mandatory minimum other than merely declaring that the 20year sentence was constitutionally excessive.203 Finally, in State v. Ricks,
the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court’s sentencing of the defendant to
10 years imprisonment for distribution of cocaine was an improper
departure from the mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years that the

196. Noble, 133 So. 3d at 705.
197. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 934 (citing Noble, 133 So. 3d at 705–06).
198. Noble, 133 So. 3d at 705.
199. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 934 (citing Noble, 133 So. 3d at 705–06).
200. See State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d 672 (La. 1998); see also State v. Morgan,
673 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996); see also State v. Ricks, 823 So. 2d
441 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
201. See Johnson, 709 So. 2d at 672.
202. See Morgan, 673 So. 2d at 256.
203. See id.
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habitual-offender statute prescribed based on the defendant’s status as a
second-time offender with a prior felony drug conviction. 204
This line of jurisprudence illustrates why a nonviolent habitual
offender’s plea for sentence review based on the grounds of constitutional
excessiveness is not truly a viable form of ameliorative relief. 205 The actual
success of these writs of review is hindered by the fact that, in most
circumstances, the version of § 15:529.1 in effect at the time defendants
committed the nonviolent offenses statutorily permitted the extended
sentences that defendants now claim are unconstitutionally excessive.206
Louisiana jurisprudence supports this conclusion, as the state’s appellate
courts have consistently held that a reviewing court may only set aside a
sentence “upon a finding of a manifest abuse of discretion by the
sentencing judge and may not consider whether another sentence would
have been more appropriate.” 207 It seems highly unlikely that a reviewing
court would find a sentencing judge to have manifestly abused their
discretion by simply following the appropriate sentencing guidelines
prescribed in the version of the habitual-offender statute in effect at the
time, especially if the sentence in question is anything less than life
imprisonment. 208
In sum, while there are a number of different forms of post-sentencing
relief available to inmates sentenced as nonviolent habitual offenders
today, none truly remedy the inequities to which these prisoners are
subjected. Parole and “good time” are a means of early release, but
prisoners can only obtain such release by serving a substantial percentage
of their unjustifiably extensive sentences. 209 Further, just because inmates
are paroled does not mean that they are free of the state’s continued
supervision. 210 Additionally, minor prison infractions as innocuous as
smoking a cigarette can prevent prisoners from even being considered by
204. See Ricks, 823 So. 2d at 441.
205. See generally State v. Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392 (La. 2020); State v. Noble,
133 So. 3d 703, 705–06 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014); Johnson, 709 So. 2d 672;
Morgan, 673 So. 2d 256; Ricks 823 So. 2d 441.
206. See State v. Ventress, 817 So. 3d 377, 382 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2002)
(ruling that a defendant must be sentenced according to the law in effect at the
time the adjudicated offense was committed, and that thus, any downward
deviations from the appropriate statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum was
unwarranted).
207. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 940 (citing State v. Taylor, 701 So. 2d 766, 772
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1997)).
208. See id.; see also cases cited supra note 174.
209. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4 (2020); id. § 15:529.1(C)(3).
210. See LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 169.
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the state’s parole board. 211 Finally, as the above-detailed jurisprudence
illustrates, seeking appellate review of their sentence appears to be an all
but fruitless endeavor for nonviolent habitual offenders. 212 Thus, it is
apparent that in order to rectify the injustices perpetrated under the
authority of Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute, further legislative
reforms are necessary.
III. FURTHER AMENDING LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES § 15:529.1
In order to effectuate the goals championed in the 2017 Louisiana
Criminal Justice Reform Act, namely reducing the state’s incarceration
rate and its ensuing burden on state taxpayers, 213 the Louisiana Legislature
must further amend Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:529.1. These
additional amendments should allow the prospective changes enacted in
House Bill 518214 to be applied retroactively to nonviolent habitual
offenders currently serving extended sentences in Louisiana state prisons
under the authority of the pre-2019 version of the statute. 215 Such an
amendment will help to bring the state’s sentencing policies more in line
with the common public sentiment that the state’s mandatory-sentencing
laws are excessively severe. 216 Finally, these amendments will allow
Louisiana to better conform its sentencing practices with the more lenient
national sentencing standards governing punishment for nonviolent
offenses. 217
211. See Skene, supra note 165.
212. See cases cited supra note 173.
213. See PEW, LOUISIANA’S 2017 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS, supra note 23.
214. Act No. 386, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
215. See LOUISIANANS FOR PRISON ALTS., supra note 21 (“The majority (64
percent) of people serving time in Louisiana prisons under the Habitual Offender
Statute are there for nonviolent crimes. Thirty-one . . . percent of people convicted
as habitual offenders are incarcerated for drug offenses.”).
216. Fritchie, supra note 18, at 938 (“Louisiana’s resistance to reform comes
at a time when public opinion conflicts with the length of the state’s mandatory
sentences, as demonstrated by a 2014 state poll that revealed that 78% of those
surveyed opposed prison terms longer than six months for persons with multiple
convictions of simple marijuana possession.”).
217. See id. (“Because the legislature resists any substantial reform, there is a
growing deviation from national sentencing standards, most notably in the area of
nonviolent, low-level drug offenses. In 2013, United States Attorney General Eric
Holder announced that low-level, nonviolent federal drug offenders could no
longer be charged under ‘ultimately counterproductive’ mandatory minimums
but, instead, must receive individual sentences.”).
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A. Current Post-Sentencing Ameliorative Relief Statutes Are Ineffective
Under current law, there appear to be three ways to effectuate the goal
of providing post-sentencing ameliorative relief to nonviolent habitual
offenders. 218 As discussed below, however, subsection K of Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 15:529.1 renders each existing method ineffective.
Thus, the most effective way for the Louisiana Legislature to remove this
statutory block is to amend § 15:529.1 to grant the reviewing judge the
discretion to amend previously adjudicated sentences in a way that
conforms with the new sentencing guidelines under § 15:529.1(C)(3),
which provides that subsequent nonviolent felony offenses may not be
considered for the purposes of enhancing a previously convicted
nonviolent felony offender’s sentence. 219
1. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.5
Legislation analogous to the above proposed amendment already
exists in the form of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 881.5,
entitled “correction of illegal sentence by trial court.”220Article 881.5 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, “On motion of the state or the
defendant, or on its own motion, at any time, the court may correct a
sentence imposed by that court which exceeds the maximum sentence
authorized by law.”221 Despite the existence of this ameliorative code
article, however, subsection K of Louisiana’s current habitual-offender
statute prevents the statute’s applicability to nonviolent habitual offenders
properly sentenced under prior versions of § 15:529.1. To refresh,
§ 15:529.1(K)(1) provides in pertinent part that “notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this
Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense
was committed.”222 In comparing this provision to the language of
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 881.5, it is apparent that the
language of § 15:529.1(K)(1) would preclude article 881.5’s availability
to defendants like the ones mentioned in the hypotheticals discussed in this
Comment’s introduction. Thus, even if a nonviolent habitual offender was
sentenced to a prison term that is no longer congruous with the provisions
of § 15:529(C)(3)—the statutory amendment effectuated in House Bill
218.
(2021).
219.
220.
221.
222.

See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 881.5 (2021); LA. REV. STAT. § 15:308
LA. REV. STAT. § 15.529.1(C)(3) (2021).
LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 881.5 (2021).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).

2022]

COMMENT

995

518—the offender’s sentence would still not meet the requirements of
article 881.5, as the length of the sentence would not exceed the maximum
sentence retroactively authorized by § 15:529.1(K)(1) and would therefore
not be considered an illegal sentence as article 881.5 requires. 223
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:308
Similar problems arise for habitual offenders seeking to have their
sentences reduced under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:308, 224 which
provides that the amendments enacted into various criminal statutes by Act
403 of the 2001 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which
included some amendments made to § 15:529.1, may be applied
retroactively for the purposes of amending a convicted defendant’s
sentence. 225 Nevertheless, cases such as State v. Dick and State v. Surry
illustrate that, while courts acknowledge that § 15:308 provides for the
retroactivity of legislative amendments to criminal statutes in some
circumstances, the language in subsection (K)(1) of the habitual-offender
statute prevents such retroactivity of the law from applying to habitual
offenders. 226
3. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 893(A)(1)(a)
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 893(A)(1)(a) also
provides nonviolent habitual offenders with some form of post-conviction
relief. 227 The article states, in pertinent part:
When it appears that the best interest of the public and of the
defendant will be served, the court, after a first, second, or third
conviction of a noncapital felony, may suspend, in whole or in
part, the imposition or execution of either or both sentences, where
suspension is allowed under the law, and in either or both cases
place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the

223. Id. § 15:529.1(C)(3); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 881.5 (2021); LA. REV.
STAT. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
224. See State v. Dick, 951 So. 2d 124 (La. 2007); see also State v. Surry, 121
So. 3d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013); see also State v. Belvin, No. 18-0421,
2019 WL 1473514 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Apr. 3, 2019).
225. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:308(B) (2021).
226. See Dick, 951 So. 2d at 124; see also Surry, 121 So. 3d at 804; Belvin,
2019 WL 1473514.
227. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893(A)(1)(a) (2021).
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division of probation and parole. 228
This article provides sentencing judges with the discretion to suspend a
habitual offender’s sentence in whole or in part if the judge deems that
such a suspension would serve the interest of both the public and the
defendant in light of the defendant’s disposition and the facts of the
particular case. 229 Despite this article, however, the cases discussed above
show that state courts are unwilling to utilize this statutory provision for
habitual offenders, even in cases in which its application would seem the
most appropriate.
For example, in the case of State v. Bryant, the Louisiana Supreme
Court refused to amend a 63-year-old man’s life sentence, authorized
under the habitual-offender statute, for his failed attempt to steal a pair of
hedge clippers, instead electing to allow him to spend the rest of his living
years behind bars. 230 On its face, it seems that this case certainly should
have warranted at least a partial suspension of the defendants sentence
when considering the best interest of the public and the defendant.231
Fortunately, the state’s review board granted Bryant parole in October
2020, 232 but a reviewing court could have provided him with the postsentencing relief he deserved long before this eventual outcome.233
Alternatively, consider the Fourth Circuit’s decision in State v. Noble, in
which a father was sentenced to over 13 years in prison based on his three
prior nonviolent felony drug convictions for simply possessing two
marijuana cigarettes for personal use. 234 In such a circumstance, the court
would have certainly served the best interest of the defendant and the
public—or more specifically Noble’s wife and children—if it had elected
to suspend at least a portion of Noble’s unconscionable sentence. 235 It
seems likely that any rational onlooker examining the facts of Noble’s case
would conclude that such a situation warranted the remedies provided by
article 893(A)(1)(a). Nevertheless, in both cases, along with many other
cases involving habitual offenders, the courts refused to exercise any such
discretion. 236
228. Id.
229. See generally id.
230. See State v. Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392, 392 (La. 2020).
231. See generally LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893(A)(1)(a) (2021).
232. See Skene, supra note 165.
233. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893(A)(1)(a) (2021).
234. See State v. Noble, 133 So. 3d 703, 703 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014).
235. See generally LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 893(A)(1)(a) (2021).
236. See State v. Bryant, 300 So. 3d 392 (La. 2020); Noble, 133 So. 3d 703;
State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d 672 (La. 1998); State v. Morgan, 673 So. 2d 256 (La.
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In sum, legislation allowing for ameliorative relief does exist in the
form of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:308 and articles 881.5 and
893(A)(1)(a). However, section K of the habitual-offender statute
illustrates that they are inadequate to remedy the excessive sentences of
nonviolent habitual offenders convicted before the House Bill 518
amendments. It seems that any statute or code article enacted by the state
legislature seeking to provide ameliorative relief would be inapplicable to
inmates sentenced under § 15:529.1 based on the statute’s requirement
that inmates must be sentenced in accordance with the version of the
statute in effect at the time of the commission of their offense. 237 Thus, it
is up to the Louisiana Legislature to address this injustice by enacting new
legislation directly providing unequivocal, ameliorative relief to the
nonviolent habitual offenders precluded from it by the current framework
of the habitual-offender statute.
B. The Need for an Unequivocal Statement of Amelioratory Rights in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:529.1
The only way to ensure that nonviolent habitual offenders sentenced
under prior versions of the habitual-offender statute may obtain
ameliorative relief is to amend § 15:529.1 by inserting additional
provisions directly within the statute’s framework. Specifically, these
provisions will serve to establish the availability of sentence review for the
purpose of realigning previously adjudicated prison terms with the
statute’s new sentencing guidelines. Until such an amendment is
instituted, nonviolent habitual offenders will continue to serve
overburdensome sentences with no reprieve in sight. As such, the
Louisiana Legislature should amend § 15:529.1 to provide as follows:
L. The provisions of Subsection C of this Section, as amended by
Act No. 386 of the 2019 Regular Session of the Legislature, shall
henceforth be made available to reviewing courts for their
consideration in determining whether to grant ameliorative relief
to nonviolent habitual offenders petitioning for sentence review
under this provision by amending petitioners’ sentences in order
to make them more congruous with the sentencing guidelines
effectuated into this Section by Act. No. 386 of the 2019 Regular
Session of the Louisiana Legislature.

Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996); State v. Ricks, 823 So. 2d 441 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2002).
237. See LA REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(K)(1) (2021).
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The new subsection L expressly grants reviewing courts the authority
to review the sentences of nonviolent habitual offenders sentenced before
the 2019 amendment in order to amend their sentences so that they better
reflect the habitual-offender statute’s new sentencing guidelines.
Additionally, in order to prevent any contradictions within the habitualoffender statute with the addition of Subsection L, Subsection K of
§ 15:529.1 will also need to be amended. 238 This revision need not be
extensive, however, as § 15:529.1(K)(1) could simply be amended to read:
“Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection and the provisions
of Subsection L of this Section, notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the court shall apply the provisions of this Section that were
in effect on the date that the defendant’s instant offense was
committed.” 239 These two additional amendments will ensure that
defendants are no longer left with hollow options for ameliorative relief
like articles 881.5 and 893(A)(1), while also explicitly stating that
sentences can be adjusted notwithstanding the ban contained in the current
version of section K.
In practice, a defendant such as Fair Wayne Bryant would be able to
petition to the court presiding over his prison term to readjust his sentence.
Such an amendment could have substantially reduced Bryant’s incredibly
lengthy sentence, while also saving the Louisiana taxpayer a significant
amount of money. Defendants like Noble, who had to serve roughly 14
years for possession of two marijuana cigarettes based on his two prior
cocaine convictions, could be reunited with their families sooner. In the
Noble case specifically, the trial court tried to rectify the injustice of
Noble’s sentence but could not because of the restrictive language of
subsection K. 240 As such, the amendments proposed herein would free
courts from the restrictive language of the current habitual-offender statute
that prevents them from exercising their judicial discretion to provide

238. See id. (“Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court shall apply the
provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant’s
instant offense was committed”).
239. See id.
240. See Noble, 133 So. 3d at 706 (“Although both trial judges clearly found
that the mandatory minimum sentence in this case (thirteen and a half years) is
grossly disproportionate to the crime in this case . . . at the resentencing hearing
the trial judge was unable to articulate additional reasons beyond those already
found insufficient by the Louisiana Supreme Court to support a downward
departure…[u]nder these circumstances, we cannot find that the trial judge abused
his discretion.”).
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more equitable sentences for defendants such as Noble and Bryant who
they believe deserve more lenient treatment under the law.
The specific language provided in these amendments is the best
solution to achieve this goal. Repealing section K of the statute altogether
would hinder the statute’s more justified purpose of appropriately
sentencing violent habitual offenders. The more modest approach
recommended herein will not only provide nonviolent habitual offenders
with the continued relief that they deserve, but it will also not conflict with
the state’s interest of punishing violent criminal acts to ensure the safety
of society. Thus, the changes enacted into the habitual-offender statute by
these amendments will adequately balance the interest of Louisiana’s
nonviolent habitual-offender inmate population with the state’s interest of
continuing to deter repeated violent criminal behavior.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana has a troubled history with its criminal-justice system and
mass incarceration, as the two issues continue to serve as a lingering
blemish on the state’s national reputation to this day. 241 The Louisiana
Legislature and Governor John Bel Edwards undoubtably pushed the state
in the right direction with the much-needed reforms they implemented in
the 2017 Louisiana Criminal Justice Reform Act along with the recent
amendments they implemented into the habitual-offender statute through
House Bill 518. However, most of these reforms only operate
prospectively. Therefore, many of the positive effects of these revisions
will not noticeably manifest themselves for several years. As a result, a
large contributor to the state’s issue of mass incarceration, namely the
lengthy—and now, unwarranted—prison sentences imposed on
nonviolent habitual offenders, will continue to persist under the state’s
currently available remedies.
As this Comment illustrates, the problem of mass incarceration, a
result of the state’s historied, overzealous application of the habitualoffender statute to nonviolent offenders, is a pressing issue that is in
desperate need of a practical and readily available solution. Thus, in order
to resolve what is one of Louisiana’s oldest and most persistent problems,
the Louisiana Legislature must take further action to amend Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 15:529.1. The model statute detailed above, providing
ameliorative relief to nonviolent habitual offenders through expanded
241. See Lea Skene, Louisiana Once Again Has Nation’s Highest
Imprisonment Rate After Oklahoma Briefly Rose to the Top, ADVOC. (Dec. 25,
2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_4dcdfe1c-213a11ea-8314-933ce786be2c.html [https://perma.cc/ZA96-22T7].
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judicial discretion for sentencing review, should be implemented by the
Louisiana Legislature in order to effectuate this necessary change.

